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We investigate whether people were insured against unexpected losses caused by the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) earthquake in 1995.    The unique household data employed led to several 
empirical findings under a natural-experimental situation.  The complete consumption 
insurance hypothesis is rejected overwhelmingly, suggesting the ineffectiveness of the formal 
and/or informal insurance mechanisms against the earthquake.  We also investigate possible 
factors that inhibit full risk-sharing.  Transfers may be particularly ineffective as insurance 
against losses for co-resident households.  Households borrow extensively against housing 
damages, whereas dissavings are utilized for smaller asset damages, implying a hierarchy of 
risk-coping measures, from dissaving to borrowing.     
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1. Introduction 
 
In the early hours of January 17, 1995, the Hanshin (Kobe) area in Japan was hit by a 
major earthquake.    The area is densely populated comprising more than 4 million people and is 
a part of the second largest industrial cluster in Japan.    The earthquake induced a human loss of 
more than 6,400, a housing property loss greater than USD 60 billion, and a capital stock loss of 
more than USD 100 billion, making it the largest economic damage recorded in history [Table 1, 
Horwich (2000); Scawthorn et al. (1997)].  Given the fact that only 3% of the property in 
Hyogo Prefecture, where Kobe is located, was covered by earthquake insurance, it is reasonable 
to assume that the earthquake was entirely unexpected in this area. On the other hand, the 
insurance coverage for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, which was hit by a massive earthquake in 
1923, was 16.0% [Yamaguchi (1999)].
1  As an unexpected, exogenous event, an earthquake 
provides an unusual, clean experimental situation under which we can investigate the functioning 
of markets and the manner in which households respond to exogenous shocks.    In other words, 
we exploit this rare natural event, which cannot be influenced by households, as an instrument to 
identify market completeness, the effectiveness of formal and/or informal insurance, and 
household behavior.
2   
There are two sets of analyses implemented in our paper.  First, we test the complete 
consumption insurance hypothesis by employing the empirical strategy of Cochrane (1991) and 
                                            
1  In fact, serious limitations do exist in private but highly-regulated insurance markets for earthquakes in 
Japan [Saito (2002); Yamaguchi (1998)].    Froot (2001) also observed that, in the United States, most insurers 
purchased relatively limited catastrophe reinsurance against natural disasters.    He concluded that this is 
attributable to supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by 
traditional reinsurers.    Nonetheless, Brookshire et al. (1985) showed that the housing market in the United 
States exhibits an effective response to the risk of damage caused by natural disasters.     
2  In a closely related paper, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) review the literature exploiting natural events as 
instruments to estimate returns to education and to identify human behavior against income and fertility 
changes.     3
Mace (1991).  It should be noted that our empirical analysis does not limit us from testing the 
existence of formal insurance markets.  Instead, we examine the validity of a wide variety of 
formal and informal insurance mechanisms such as borrowing and receiving private and/or 
public transfers against the earthquake [Mace (1991)].    According to our analysis, the complete 
risk-sharing hypothesis is overwhelmingly rejected, which suggests the ineffectiveness of the 
formal and/or informal insurance mechanisms against the earthquake.     
Second, we investigate possible factors that inhibit consumption insurance by 
comparing the effectiveness of different risk-coping strategies, i.e., dissaving as well as 
borrowing and receiving private and/or public transfers.
3  According to our empirical results, 
transfers are likely to be ineffective against negative shocks, particularly for co-resident 
households.    We have also found that the risk-coping means are specific to the nature of the loss 
caused by the earthquake.  For instance, households borrow extensively against housing 
damages, whereas dissavings are utilized to compensate for smaller damages caused to assets.  
This implies the existence of a hierarchy of risk-coping measures, starting from dissaving to 
borrowing.   
Two aspects differentiate our study from earlier studies.  First, we utilize shocks 
generated by a natural disaster, an aspect that has been rarely utilized in the previous studies on 
full consumption insurance such as Cochrane (1991), Fafchamps (2003), Hayashi et al. (1996), 
Mace (1991), Kohara, Ohtake, and Saito (2002), and Townsend (1994).  In order to test the 
complete insurance model, these existing studies typically employed income changes, 
information on illness, involuntary job loss, and strikes as explanatory variables, which are not 
perfectly exogenous to the decision problems faced by a typical household, resulting in a 
                                            
3  In a closely related study, Zhang and Ogaki (2004) test the risk-sharing hypothesis against the permanent 
income hypothesis.       4
possible estimation bias [Cochrane (1991); Mace (1991); Townsend (1994)].    On the other hand, 
since we used the direct shock variables resulting from the unexpected earthquake, we believe 
that our results are less susceptible to econometric problems.  In fact, a paper by Kohara, 
Ohtake, and Saito (2001) has tested and rejected the full consumption insurance hypothesis 
against the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake by employing region-specific slope dummies for the 
income change variables.  Our empirical analysis confirms their findings by employing direct 
shock measures from a richer data set collected in the earthquake-hit areas.    This data set allows 
us to differentiate a wide variety of shocks generated by the earthquake.
4  We believe that our 
data provides us with a clean experimental situation. 
Second, unlike the study by Kohara et al. (2001), we explicitly investigate the reason 
behind the strong rejection of the full consumption hypothesis.  Moreover, unlike previous 
studies on household behavior against general shocks, such as Horioka, Murakami, and Kohara 
(2002) and Kochar (1999), this study examines the relative effectiveness of various risk-coping 
devices against sudden natural disasters.  To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has 
employed household-level data in order to investigate quantitatively the role of savings, 
borrowing, and other risk-coping devices against natural disasters in Japan.
5   
The remainder of this study comprises three sections: Sections 2 and 3 establish the 
theoretical and econometric frameworks, respectively.  In Section 4, after a brief overview of 
the data set, we present the findings that emerged from our econometric analysis.  The final 
section contains a summary with concluding remarks. 
                                            
4  The official data set employed by Kohara et al. (2001) suffers from a serious attrition problem during the 
earthquake.    The data set retains only one quarter of the original households in the areas hit by the earthquake.     
5  Previous related studies found that Japanese households maintain significant amounts of precautionary 
savings [Horioka and Watanabe (1997); Horioka, Murakami, and Kohara (2002); Shimizutani (2002); Zhou 
(2003)].    Skidmore (2001) have attributed the high savings rate of Japanese to the high frequency of 
catastrophes such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and typhoons.       5
2. The Model Framework 
 
In developed as well as developing countries, people are at the risk of ex post shocks in 
their day-to-day lives [World Bank (2001)].  For example, accidents, sickness, or sudden death 
can disable the head of a household or even an entire family.  Macroeconomic instabilities or 
recessions, which tend to generate harsh inflation/deflation and widespread unemployment, can 
also significantly reduce the real value of household resources.  However, natural disasters can 
generate the most serious consequences ever known.  Households have developed formal and 
informal risk-coping mechanisms against a wide variety of shocks [Besley (1995); Fafchamps 
(2003); Townsend (1994, 1995)].  We classify such insurance opportunities as mutual and 
self-insurance opportunities [Hayashi et al. (1996)].  We then formulate simple theoretical and 
empirical frameworks to examine the effectiveness of these two mechanisms against the 
unexpected damages caused by natural disasters.     
Mutual insurance provides consumption insurance opportunities across households 
through a variety of either market or non-market mechanisms.  First, formal insurance markets 
act as effective consumption insurance by nature.    Second, households can utilize credit market 
transactions to smooth consumption by reallocating future resources to current consumption.    It 
can be theoretically shown that the lack of consumption insurance is compensated for by easy 
access to the credit market [Eswaran and Kotwal (1989)].
6   Third, through informal 
arrangements of state-contingent mutual transfers among relatives, friends, and neighbors, a 
                                            
6  However, due to various reasons, households often have limited access to credit markets [Jappelli (1990)], 
which can be attributed to the high information cost and/or lack of assets for collateral [Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)].    The existence of credit constraints has significant negative impacts on a household’s asset portfolio 
choice and the risk-coping abilities [Paxson (1990); Guiso et al. (1992)].    However, Horioka and Kohara 
(1999), and Sawada et al. (2003) observed that less than 10% of the households face credit constraints in Japan.   
Therefore, the overall impact of credit constraints may not be very significant in Japan.       6
household can achieve consumption smoothing [Cochrane (1991); Hayashi et al. (1996); Mace 
(1991); Townsend (1987, 1994, 1995)].
7  Finally, the government can also complement the 
risk-coping behavior of households by various methods.  Direct public transfers through 
means-tested targeting, tagging, or geographical/group targeting such as unemployment 
insurance or workfare can act as a formal safety net for households facing difficulties.     
With regard to self-insurance, in the event of unexpected negative shocks, households can 
utilize their own financial and physical assets that have been accumulated beforehand [Guiso et 
al. (1992); Caroll and Samwick (1998); Zhou (2003)].
8  Such precautionary savings can be in 
the form of bank deposits, cash holdings, jewelry, and physical assets such as land and real estate.   
In Japan, a major portion of household assets is commonly held in the form of cash and cash 
equivalents including bank accounts [Allen and Gale (2000); Chapter 3] as well as land and real 
estate.   
 
The Full Consumption Insurance Model 
 
First, we formulated a complete insurance market model in a pure exchange economy to 
characterize the role of mutual insurance [Cochrane (1991); Mace (1991); Saito (1999); 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 7; Townsend (1987)].  The assumption of complete 
markets for contingent claims may appear unrealistic; however, as explained by Mace (1991), de 
facto household-level insurance can be attained through a wide variety of realistic market and 
                                            
7  It is also important to note that the self-enforcement mechanisms of this self-interested mutual insurance 
scheme could be sustained as sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in a repeated game framework [Coate and 
Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996)].     
8 Zhou (2003) observed that precautionary saving arising from earnings uncertainty comprises 5.56% of the 
total savings of salaried worker households and, a remarkable 64.3% of the total savings of agricultural, 
forestry, fishery, and self-employed households.       7
non-market mechanisms.  Examples of such mechanisms include credit, stocks, and security 
markets; government’s state-contingent transfers such as unemployment insurance and disaster 
insurance schemes; and informal transfer networks among family members or close communities.   
Our aim is to test the efficacy of informal/formal networks and/or markets to achieve efficient 
resource  allocation.   
Let us assume that households trade dated claims contingent upon sequence of states at 
time t, s
t = [s0, s1, s2,  ･･･, st], where st refers to publicly observable states at time t.  All  of  these 
claims are traded at time zero and there exists a complete set of securities for these contingent 
claims that are traded at the price p  (s
t).  In other words, households purchase a 
history-dependent consumption plan.    Then, the optimization problem of a household, i, having 
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where π is the probability attached to a particular history of states, ω represents the household’s 
stochastic endowment that is exogenously given and depends on the realization of st, and Ω
t 
represents a set of the entire history of all possible states at time t.  By  solving  this  problem,  we 
obtained a set of the first-order necessary conditions: 
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for all states where λ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the life-time budget constraint in 
the problem (1).    Under the complete market assumption, the prices of contingent claims, p (s
t), 
will be the same for all households in the equilibrium.  We impose a common-knowledge 
assumption that there exists an objective probability, π (s
t), for the occurrence of s
t.  Further, 




















for all states.    It should be noted that this is an efficiency condition, which can be derived from 
a benevolent social planner’s problem, maximizing the weighted sum of people’s utilities [Mace 
(1991)].  Let us suppose that the utility function takes the form of a constant absolute risk 
aversion function, i.e., u (cit) = -(1/α) exp (-αcit).    By arranging equation (3), we obtain: 
 

















where ∆ is a first-difference operator and N represents the number of households in an insurance 
network.  The equations (3) and (4) indicate that, under full insurance, idiosyncratic household 
income changes should be absorbed by all other members in the same insurance network.    As a 
result, idiosyncratic income shocks should not affect consumption changes.     
  On the other hand, when contingent claims are not traded among households, the 
security prices can differ across them.    Hence, we can denote the shadow price for such claims   9
by  pi  (s
t).  In this case, derived from a modified version of equation (2), we obtain the 
following:  
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Equation (5) indicates that a household’s consumption level is affected by aggregate factors as 
well as the idiosyncratic shadow price, which is endogenously determined by individual 
endowments and consumption preferences.     
 
Forms of Risk-Sharing and Self-Insurance 
 
Even in the absence of complete markets for contingent claims, households are able to 
insure themselves against unexpected shocks [Saito (1999)].    Accordingly, the second model of 
this study conforms with the self-insurance model elaborated by Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), 
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chapter 13).  It should be noted that we augment the 
self-insurance model by the addition of transfer income and/or borrowing possibilities.  This 
implies that we also relax the unrealistic assumption of a complete lack of income insurance.     
A household’s decision is to choose a consumption path in order to maximize the 
conditional expectation of discounted lifetime utility subject to usual intertemporal budget 
constraints with exogenous interest rate, r, and possibilities of credit constraints.    If the income 
is stochastic, analytical solutions to this problem cannot generally be derived [Zeldes (1989)].  
However, we can derive a set of first-order necessary conditions by forming a value function and   10
Bellman equation to obtain an optimum solution.  Let µ represent the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with credit constraints.
9  Combining the envelope condition derived from the 
first-order necessary conditions, we obtain a consumption Euler equation, which is augmented by 
the possibility of a binding credit constraint as follows [Zeldes (1989)]: 
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We can interpret the Lagrange multiplier, µ, as an indicator of negative welfare effects generated 
by binding credit constraints.  It should be noted that the Lagrange multiplier, µ is a negative 
function of the current asset, income, and the maximum value of borrowing.    It is evident that a 
decrease in these variables of a credit-constrained household, given other variables, leads to an 
increase in the marginal utility of current consumption causing, in turn, the Lagrange multiplier 
to increase.  It is important to notice that the self-insurance model represented by equation (6) 
involves much weaker restrictions than the risk-sharing model of equation (3).  Acceptance of 
equation (6) cannot rule out the rejection of equation (3) at all [Saito (1999), p.53].     
  If the utility function is again supposed to take the form of a constant absolute risk 



























                                            
9 This  term,  µ, is equal to the increase in the expected lifetime utility that is possible if the current constraints 
are relaxed by one unit.  Since the household is constrained from further borrowing but not from further 
saving, µ enters with a positive sign.     11
where e is a rational expectation error and µ’ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit 
constraints standardized by the marginal utility of future consumption.  From the intertemporal 
budget constraints, we have: yt
T + yt
N - nt = st + ct, where yt
T, yt
N, nt, and st are transfer income, 
non-transfer income, a negative shock to the assets, and net savings, respectively.  We assume 
that transfer income is determined endogenously, while non-transfer income and an asset shock 
are exogenously given.  Since net saving flows are defined as gross asset accumulation minus 
gross borrowing, we have the following linearized version of equation (7) from the income and 
savings perspective [Flavin (1999) and Kochar (2003)]: 
 





























where b and d are borrowing and dissaving, respectively.    The last two terms on the right-hand 
side represent the effects of credit constraints and the mean zero independent expectation error.  
It should be noted that µ’ is a negative function of initial income and assets.  Therefore, for 
example, those who own assets or are less credit-constrained can achieve a smaller amount of 
left-hand side variables.  Equation (8) formally shows that there are three possible risk-coping 
strategies against realized negative shocks, whose absolute values are represented by -∆y
N
t+∆nt, 
namely, borrowing additional amounts, receiving transfer income, or increased dissaving.     
We investigate the responses against various negative shocks caused by the earthquake.   
However, since we do not explicitly model the decisions in relation to various risk-coping 
strategies, we cannot estimate equation (8) directly.  Alternatively, we examine the following 
three cases: first, the case with neither dissaving nor transfers; second, the case with constrained 
credit and dissaving; and, third, the case with binding credit constraints without transfers.       12
In the first case, dissaving as a means of risk-coping is assumed to be impossible.   An 
upper limit inherently exists on dissaving due to the fact that ∆dt ≤ dt.    Therefore, in cases with a 
large negative income shock, dissaving proves to be ineffective as a risk-coping device.  This 
occurs if the maximum possible amount of dissaving, dt, is smaller than the absolute magnitude 
of the negative shock, -∆y
N
t+∆nt.  As a result, in an extreme case where ∆dit = 0 and transfers 
are limited as well, borrowing becomes the only risk-coping device: 
 

























+ ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ − , (9) 
 
where, under weaker assumptions, ε1 will include transfers and dissaving components.     
Second, we consider the case where both borrowing and dissaving are constrained and 
thus, a transfer income is the only instrument to cope with unexpected shocks.  In this case, a 
transfer income is the only available risk-coping device: 
 



























+ ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ − , (10) 
 
where, under weaker assumptions, ε2 will include effects through borrowing and dissaving.     
  Finally, we consider the case of binding credit constraints and no transfers.  When the 
household absolutely cannot use borrowing to cope with the realized shock and thus ∆bt = 0, the 
household utilizes dissaving and/or transfers to compensate for the losses caused by the 
unexpected shock.  Moreover, we assume that a transfer network is also limited and cannot be 
utilized effectively.  The household tries to accumulate precautionary savings in advance and   13
employ them as a risk-coping device against unexpected events: 
 

























+ ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ − , (11) 
 
where, under weaker assumptions, ε3 will include borrowing and transfer components.     
 
3. The Econometric Framework   
 
The Full Consumption Insurance Model 
 
In the empirical analyses, we first test the full consumption insurance model of equations 
(4) and (5).  Following Cochrane (1991) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), an estimation 
equation for equations (4) and (5) can be expressed as follows: 
 










where k is an identifier of regional insurance networks and R
a is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if i-th household is located in the region, k.  We utilize the area dummies for the 
variable  R
a to control the average consumption in equations (4) and (5).  The matrix, X, 
comprises indicators of household income shocks and asset shocks.  The final term on the 
right-hand side of the equation is a well-behaved error term.  On comparing equations (4) and 
(5), it is evident that the null hypothesis of a full consumption insurance market is that all the   14
elements of a vector, γ, in equation (12) are jointly zero.  Unfortunately, we do not have either 
the consumption or expenditure data.    Nevertheless, the qualitative information on consumption 
changes is available.  From the data, we can construct a dummy variable, I
c, which takes the 
value of one if the household consumption has changed and the value of zero otherwise.  




i = 1 if ∆ci ≠ 0, 
      I
c
i = 0 otherwise.       (13) 
 
We assume that the error term in equation (12) follows normal distribution and estimate the 
model of equations (12) and (13) by using the probit model.  Although we cannot identify the 
direction of consumption changes from our data, we can observe whether consumption has 
changed—this information is used as a dependent variable.    Even in such cases, the rejection of 
the null hypothesis should coincide with the rejection of the necessary condition for the full 
insurance model, while the failure to reject does not necessarily support the full insurance model.     
 
Forms of Risk-Sharing and Self-Insurance 
 
The second empirical model is in keeping with Flavin (1999) and we estimate equations 
(9), (10), and (11).    By doing so, we investigate the responses of the three risk-coping strategies, 
i.e., borrowing, receiving transfer income, and dissaving against various negative shocks caused 
by the earthquake.
10  Since the adoption of risk-coping strategies are observed as discrete 
                                            
10  Our empirical model of self-insurance is similar to Takasaki et al. (2004), which examined the risk-coping 
strategies of Amazonian households in response to the flood and health shocks.       15
variables, based on the different risk-coping strategies, we estimate three binary-dependent 
variable models.  Based on equations (9), (10), and (11), we assume the dependence of three 
different risk-coping strategies through the correlations of error terms, εm, m=1, 2, and 3.    Under 
the assumption of joint normality of the error terms, our model is a three-equation multivariate 
(trivariate) probit model for equations (9), (10), and (11) as follows: 
 
  ∆bi = Siθ1 + Hiβ1 + ε1i, (14) 
  ∆y
T
i = Siθ2 + Hiβ2 + ε2i, (15) 
  ∆di = Siθ3 + Hiβ3 + ε3i, (16) 
  p1i = 1 if ∆bi > 0 and 0 otherwise, (17) 
  p2i = 1 if ∆y
T
i > 0 and 0 otherwise, (18) 
  p3i = 1 if ∆di > 0 and 0 otherwise, (19) 
 
where we need to impose the conditions var(ε1i) = var(ε2i) = var(ε3i) = 1 for identification.  In 
equations (14), (15), and (16), S represents a matrix of household-specific shock variables 
generated by the earthquake and that H is a matrix of household characteristics and other control 
variables, some of which are proxy variables of credit constraints.  We do not directly observe 
the intensities of the risk-coping strategy, i.e., ∆b, ∆y
T, and ∆d; hence, our dependent variables in 
equations (17), (18), and (19) express whether a household adopted a particular risk-coping 
device against the earthquake, which can be represented by a discrete variable, pm, m = 1, 2, and 
3.    The variance-covariance matrix of εmi is symmetric and the covariances are assumed to be 
non-zero.   
In order to estimate the parameters under this setting, we can employ the log-likelihood   16
function, which depends on the trivariate standard normal distribution function.  We utilize the 
algorithm given in Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) in order to estimate the trivariate probit model 
using the method of simulated maximum likelihood, also known as the 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator.     
 
4. The Data Set and Empirical Results 
 
The data set employed in this study is the survey data collected by the Hyogo Prefecture 
on consumer life after the earthquake, Shinsai-go no Kurashi no Henka kara Mita Shouhi 
Kouzou ni Tsuite no Chousa Houkokusho (Research Report on Changes in Lifestyles and 
Consumption Behavior Following Disasters), which is summarized by Hyogo Prefecture 
(1997).
11  The survey was conducted in October 1996 in the Higashinada-ku, Kita-ku, and 
Suma-ku districts of Kobe, Akashi, and Nishinomiya cities, the six areas seriously affected by 
the earthquake.    The survey was completed by 1,589 women aged above 30, who were selected 
on the basis of a stratified random sampling scheme.    The respondents continued living in these 
earthquake-hit areas twenty-one months after the onset of earthquake.  This may generate a 
sample selection bias because several people relocated to other areas after the earthquake.    The 
data limitation does not allow us to correct the potential endogenous sample selection bias.  
Nevertheless, a survey by Hayashi and Tatsuki (1999) reveals that on an average, the degree of 
damage caused by the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake to houses was larger for those who 
moved to locations outside the earthquake-hit areas than those who remained within the areas.  
This suggests that the empirical findings reported in this paper underestimate the negative impact 
                                            
11 The data set was released on March 25, 1997 by Hyogo-ken Seikatsu Bunka-bu Seikatsu Souzou-ka Shouhi 
Seikatsu Taisaku-shitsu (Hyogo Prefecture, Department of Livelihood and Culture, Livelihood Creation 
Section, Office for Livelihood Policy).       17
of the earthquake.     
The definitions and summary statistics of the variables are given in Table 2.  The first 
key question covered in the survey was whether a household’s overall consumption behavior 
changed prior to and after the earthquake.  Approximately 62.7% of the respondents answered 
in the affirmative.    While we cannot identify the direction of the change from our data, it is only 
natural to presume that, largely, the household consumption behavior was negatively affected.  
We use this variable as a dependent variable to test the full-insurance model.  The second key 
variable is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if a household reported as having faced 
unexpected pressure to increase the expenditure in order to cope with the shock caused by the 
earthquake and zero otherwise.  More than 80% of households reported that their expenditures 
increased unexpectedly due to the earthquake.     
While estimating various risk-coping models, we employ binary-dependent variables of 
the three risk-coping strategies, i.e., borrowing, receiving public and private transfers, and 
dissaving.
12   Figure 1 represents the sample structure.  As indicated in Table 2, approximately 
20% of all respondents replied that their expenditure remained unchanged with respect to the 
earthquake.  Nevertheless, a substantial number of households did not disclose their coping 
strategies against the shock caused by the earthquake.  We have decided to exclude these 
households from our sample when we investigate risk-coping models because necessary 
information is not available to conduct our econometric analysis.    Among the respondents who 
faced an increase in their expenditure due to the earthquake, approximately 25% managed to 
cope by changing the constituents of consumption and more than half utilized their dissavings.  
                                            
12  The questionnaire inquired about both the most important strategy (single choice) as well as other strategies 
(multiple choices).    The estimation described in this study only utilized the single-choice answers.   
Borrowings included those from financial institutions, relatives, and/or friends.    Dissavings included saving 
for retirement, children (e.g. costs of education), houses (purchases or renovation), durables (e.g. automobiles), 
leisure (personal trips), and unexpected events (disasters or sickness).       18
Borrowing and receiving transfers were also considered as significant risk-coping strategies for 
approximately 10% and 12% of valid responses, respectively.     
In the following section in Table 2, two income shock variables are shown.    The first is 
a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if there exists a household with a positive 
income shock caused by the earthquake; approximately 6.3% of all households fell into this 
category.  The second is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one for those households 
that face a negative income shock caused by the earthquake; such households accounted for 
approximately 33.9% of all households, indicating a significant portion of households with 
declining  income.   
With regard to the remaining variables, Table 2 shows the summary statistics for those 
households whose consumption decisions were disrupted by the earthquake.  We obtain three 
sets of independent variables.  The first set of variables comprises a wide variety of shock 
variables.    The survey was carried out in order to record the details of the damage caused to the 
respondents by the earthquake, such as damages to the house, the household assets, and the 
health of the family members.  It should be noted that, shortly after the earthquake, the local 
governments conducted metrical surveys and issued formal certificates for housing damages 
using which the households could later obtain government compensations.  Therefore, we 
believe that the information obtained on housing damages is fairly objective and accurate.  It 
should be noted that 85.6% and 86.7% of the respondents suffered from damages to their house 
and household assets, respectively.  These figures are indicative of the seriousness of the 
economic loss caused by the earthquake.     
  The second set comprises household characteristics.  First, the rate of housing 
ownership is approximately 72% prior to the earthquake, with approximately 40% among them   19
having outstanding housing loans.  The average age of the respondents is 51 years, and a 
majority of the respondents are high school graduates or lower.  Majority of the respondents 
live with their children, and the rate of joint-family/co-residence is approximately 20%.    On the 
other hand, nearly 4% of the surveyed respondents are single.
13   
Finally, to control for the unobserved heterogeneity generated by the difference in the 
influences of the earthquake, we include the district-specific dummy variables.  Since, among 
other things, the effects of the earthquake are determined by the proximity to its hypocenter, we 
believe that the inclusion of the district dummies is a reasonable choice.     
 
Estimation Results: Full Consumption Insurance 
 
The estimation results for the full-insurance model are shown in Table 3.  We employ 
two different sets of shock variables, i.e., two income shock variables and a set of various shock 
variables, as shown in specifications (I) and (II), respectively.  According to Table 3, in both 
cases, the joint test overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis of the full-consumption model.     
We also test the full consumption insurance hypothesis by using sample A or sample B 
represented in Figure 1 [Table 3, specifications (III) and (IV), respectively].  With regard to 
sample A, which is composed of the households that were forced to increase their expenditure 
after the earthquake, the consumption of the households was significantly affected by the shocks 
from the earthquake.    Accordingly, we reject the full insurance hypothesis strongly.    However, 
with regard to sample B, i.e., those who were insulated from the earthquake, the joint test of zero 
coefficients for the full insurance hypothesis cannot be rejected at 1% level of statistical 
                                            
13  Also, household income at the time of the survey was recorded by income category.    The median annual 
household income is approximately between 6 million and 8 million yen (approximately USD 50,000-67,000).       20
significance [Table 3, specification (IV)].  This implies that the earthquake did not create 
serious shocks leading to a change in the consumption of these households in sample B.     
In summary, we conclude that formal and informal mutual insurance mechanisms are 
incomplete against the earthquake, particularly for those who were forced to increase their 
expenditure because of the earthquake.    Particularly, the magnitude of coefficients in relation to 
major or moderate damages to houses and household assets is considerable [specification (I) of 
Table 3].    This finding suggests that the lack of insurance for real estates and physical assets is 
particularly serious.     
 
Estimation Results: Forms of Risk-Sharing and Self-Insurance 
 
In order to estimate the trivariate probit model of risk-coping behaviors represented by 
equations (9), (10), and (11), we employ sample A in Figure 1.    The estimation results reported 
in Table 4 can be summarized in the following findings.  First, the column for borrowing 
reveals that people primarily coped with major or minor housing damages by borrowing.  
Additionally, we observe that borrowing was possible particularly for those who owned houses 
prior to the earthquake, which suggests the importance of collateral in obtaining a loan after the 
earthquake.  Alternatively, a credit-constrained household might have been unable to utilize 
borrowing as a risk-coping device against negative shocks caused by the earthquake.  The 
marginally significant and positive coefficient of the co-residence dummy variable is consistent 
with anecdotal evidence that the constructions of Nisetai Jyu-taku (two-generation houses) by 
using housing loans assumed great popularity among the households who lost their houses 
because of the earthquake.       21
With regard to transfers, the second column in Table 4 represents the estimation results 
of the transfer model.  While moderate housing damages may be coped with by receiving 
transfers, interestingly, co-resident households, which account for 20% of all households in our 
sample, shy away from systematically using transfers against the earthquake shocks.  We test 
the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of moderate housing damages and 
co-residence is zero.  The Wald statistics for this null hypothesis is 0.56, thus failing to reject 
the null hypothesis.    This finding suggests that co-resident households are subject to a spatially 
undiversified informal safety network and thus, for them, transfers are ineffective risk-coping 
devices against shocks from the earthquake.  We may conclude that the ineffectiveness of 
transfers, particularly for co-resident households, is one of the important reasons due to which 
we reject the complete consumption insurance hypothesis strongly.     
With regard to the effectiveness of self-insurance, we can consider the final column for 
dissaving in Table 4.  Since the coefficient on the dummy variable for minor household asset 
damage is positive and marginally significant, we may conclude that dissaving was employed as 
a risk-coping device against minor damages to the households’ assets.  Along with the finding 
that dissavings were utilized to compensate for smaller losses while larger shocks were coped by 
borrowing, our empirical findings suggest the existence of a hierarchy of risk-coping measures, 
starting from dissaving to borrowing.  Moreover, those with outstanding housing loans prior to 
the earthquake were less likely to use dissaving as a coping strategy, as they probably had not 
accumulated sufficient precautionary savings.
14   
                                            
14  Interestingly, the coefficient on age squared is only marginally insignificant, suggesting that age has a 
nonlinear but positive impact on the probability of adopting dissaving conditional on the age of the respondent.   
Since the coefficients of age and age squared are 0.0449 and 0.0066, respectively, if a respondent’s age is 
greater than 68 years, the age has a significant positive impact on the probability of adopting dissaving as a 
risk-coping strategy.    This might be reflective of life-cycle effects.    Under a finite horizon, the optimal 
amount of precautionary savings is a positive function of the length of the remaining life [Caballero (1990)].     22
Finally, estimated correlations among the error terms in the case of trivariate and probit 
models are shown in Table 5.  The likelihood test statistics for the null hypothesis that the 
covariances are jointly zero, is 165.77.  This result overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis 
of independent error terms, a finding that supports the adoption of the multivariate probit model.   
More importantly, the covariances for the error terms of borrowing and dissaving equations and 
of transfer and dissaving equations are both negative.  These findings imply that 
borrowing/transfers and dissaving are substitutes.  This suggests that self-insurance acts as a 
compensation for the lack of mutual insurance.  On the other hand, the covariance of error 
terms of borrowing and transfers is positive, suggesting a complementary relation between 
borrowing and receiving transfers.   This may indicate that the rich, with collateralizable assets, 
can obtain both loans and transfer incomes, while the poor are excluded from both a credit 
market and an insurance network against natural disasters.  This finding is contrary to the 
results by Cox and Jappelli (1990) using the US data, which found that credit-constrained 
households are more likely to receive transfers.     
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, we examined people’s safety and management of unexpected resource 
losses caused by a sudden earthquake that occurred in Kobe in 1995.  We utilized a unique 
household-level data collected shortly after the earthquake.  First, according to our estimation 
results, the complete risk-sharing hypothesis was overwhelmingly rejected.    Nevertheless, even 
with the unavailability of complete markets for contingent claims, households are capable of 
                                                                                                                                             
The positive coefficient on the age variable might capture this effect—older persons are more willing than 
younger persons, who have more years to live, to dissave in order to cope with shocks.       23
adopting a wide variety of risk-coping devices against negative shocks created by the earthquake.   
We then investigated the effectiveness of a household’s risk-coping mechanisms against the 
shock caused by the earthquake.  Firstly, transfers are likely to be ineffective against the loss 
caused by the earthquake, particularly for co-resident households.  Moreover, we observe that 
the means for coping are specific to the nature of shocks caused by the earthquake.  For 
example, borrowing was extensively used to recover the housing damages, while dissavings were 
utilized to compensate for the loss of smaller household assets.    Additionally, we observed that 
dissaving and borrowing/transfers are likely to be substitutes.  These findings suggest the 
existence of a hierarchy of risk-coping, starting from dissaving to borrowing.     
Our empirical results imply a serious lack of insurance markets for damages to real 
estates and physical assets.  These findings are not surprising if we consider the low 
participation rate of earthquake insurance.  Without effective ex ante measures, the actual 
economic losses caused by an earthquake as enormous as the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake 
prove to be extremely large for the government to support effectively.  In fact, after the 
earthquake, the central and local governments provided the largest financial support in the 
history of Japan to reconstruct the affected areas and to facilitate economic recovery of the 
victims.  Despite the extensive support provided by the government, direct transfers to victims 
who lost their houses were merely USD 1,000-1,500 per household due to a high rate of casualty.     
In the process of preparing well-designed social safety nets against future natural 
disasters, there exist two policy implications based on our analyses: first, in its attempt to provide 
ex post public support in the event of a natural disaster, the government may create a moral 
hazard problem by encouraging people to expose themselves to greater risks than required 
[Horwich (2000)].  Our empirical results suggest that providing subsidized loans, rather than   24
direct transfers, to victims can be a good example of facilitating risk-coping behavior; such 
interventions are less likely to create serious moral hazard problems.  Second, it would be 
imperative to design ex ante risk-management policies against the earthquake.  For example, 
development of markets for earthquake insurance would lead to the efficient pricing of insurance 
premium and efficient land market prices reflective of the amount of risk involved with lands 
[Saito (2002)].  This development would generate proper incentives to invest in mitigations 
such as investments in earthquake-proof constructions against future earthquakes.  These ex 
ante measures would significantly reduce the overall social loss caused by the earthquake.  
Issues such as these will be important research topics in the future.       25
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The Structure of Data 
 
 
   
 





Changes in expenditure due to the 
earthquake (1217) 
Coped by reallocating 
constituents of expenditure 
(148) 






Coped by dissaving 
(318) 
Missing 
observations   
(625) 
No changes in expenditure 
due to the earthquake (295) 
SampleA 
Sample B   
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Table 1   















































































Source a: Table 1 in Freeman, Keen, and Mani (2003); b: Niigata Prefecture, Japan; c: the authors’ 
estimates using information from the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Finance of the Government of 
Japan; d: the authors’ calculation based on the information from Risk Management Solutions (RMS).   31
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used 
 





Dummy = 1 if the household consumption behavior changed 




Dummy = 1 if the household faced an increase in its 







Dummy = 1 if reallocations of the constituents of the 












Dummy = 1 if receiving transfers was the most significant 





Income Shock Variables 
 
 
































Dummy = 1 if health-related shocks were caused to the family 




Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviation.   32
Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used 
Variable Description  Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Household Characteristics  




Dummy = 1 if household had outstanding housing loans prior 
to the earthquake 
0.319 
Age of the respondent  51.190 
(10.842) 
Age squared  2737.731 
(1135.305) 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent 
was high school   
0.518 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent 
was junior college or equivalent 
0.243 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent 
was university or higher 
0.137 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent was single  0.042 
 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent lived with children  0.623 
 




Regional Dummy Variables 
 
Dummy = 1 for Higashinada-ku (default category)  0.163 
Dummy = 1 for Kita-ku  0.136 
Dummy = 1 for Suma-ku  0.136 
Dummy = 1 for Akashi city  0.370 
Dummy = 1 for Nishinomiya City  0.181 
Dummy = 1 for other area 
 
0.014   33
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Income Shock Variables 
 
    
Dummy = 1 if the income shock due to the 
earthquake was positive 
0.052 
(0.146) 
   
Dummy = 1 if the income shock due to the 
earthquake was negative 
0.351*** 
(0.077) 




    
Dummy = 1 if major housing damage was 







Dummy = 1 if moderate housing damage 







Dummy = 1 if minor housing damage was 







Dummy = 1 if major household asset 







Dummy = 1 if minor household asset 







Dummy = 1 if health-related shocks were 



















Wald test statistics for a null hypothesis 
under which the coefficients on shock 












1332 1289 512  246 
 
Note: We employed a dummy variable as a dependent variable; it took the value of one if the household 
consumption behavior changed prior to and after the earthquake and the value of zero otherwise.  We 
also included the regional dummy variables that have not been reported here.    The symbol *** indicates 
statistical significance at the 1% level.   34
Table 4 
Comparisons of Different Risk-Coping Strategies 
(Sample A; multivariate Probit models) 



















Dummy = 1 if major housing damage was caused 







Dummy = 1 if moderate housing damage was 







Dummy = 1 if minor housing damage was caused 







Dummy = 1 if major household asset damage was 







Dummy = 1 if minor household asset damage was 







Dummy = 1 if health-related shocks were caused 
















Dummy = 1 if household had outstanding housing 

























Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the 







Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the 







Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the 










































522 522 522 
Note: We also included the regional dummy variables.  In this table, we reported coefficients rather than the 
marginal effects.  Huber-White consistent robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and ***, 
indicate statistical significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   35
Table 5 
Covariances of error terms 
(Sample A; multivariate Probit models) 
 
 Covariance  Standard 
Error 
    
Covariance between ε1 and ε2 
 
0.105 (0.125) 
Covariance between ε1 and ε3 
 
-0.808 (0.127)*** 
Covariance between ε2 and ε3 -0.924 (0.139)*** 
    
 
Note: * and ***, indicate statistical significance at the10% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 